In the India-Pakistan strategic dynamic, China has emerged as an inextricable third actor, turning a bilateral rivalry into a triangular matter. While military escalation in the subcontinent does not align with Beijing’s strategic interests, its pro-Pakistan leanings often manifest on international platforms. Most recently, China blocked the designation of The Resistance Front (TRF), an alleged offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), following the 2025 Pahalgam attack. This move reflects a longstanding pattern: China has consistently complicated New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan-based groups in global forums.
As India seeks broader consensus on counterterrorism designations, particularly at the UN Security Council (UNSC), China has frequently intervened by blocking or delaying the listing of individuals affiliated with anti-India groups such as LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). A “technical hold” in the UNSC sanctions process allows a member state to indefinitely delay designation without a formal veto. For decades, China has exploited this to delay, if not deny, sanctions on Pakistan-linked terror architecture without triggering a diplomatic confrontation.
The symbolic framing of China-Pakistan relations, famously described by former Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani as “higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey”, for now has translated into sustained strategic cover for Pakistan on the international stage. Chinese media’s description of terrorism in India, such as the Pahalgam attack, as a case of “shooting” by local gunmen against civilians, further supports the Pakistani narrative of the conflict.
‘Technical Holds’
China’s pattern of using “technical holds” in the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee can be traced to the early 2000s. After the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, India began pushing for international sanctions against Pakistan-based outfits. While China supported the designation of groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, it remained reluctant to target individuals associated with these anti-India groups, most notably JeM chief Masood Azhar, who was finally listed in 2019. India’s first formal request to enlist Azhar came in 2009, following the Mumbai attacks and was followed up in 2016, 2017, and 2019. While international pressure eventually influenced this reversal after two decades, the exclusion of any reference to the Pulwama attack in the final listing allowed China to maintain that Azhar’s designation was based on his long-standing links to terrorism rather than a specific attack on India.
Over time, the Pathankot attack of 2016 and the Pulwama suicide bombing in 2019 resulted in intensified Indian diplomatic efforts targeting Pakistan-based terrorist leaders and groups. All efforts were impeded by China’s technical holds, despite co-sponsorship by France, the UK, and the US. At large, this trend continues. In 2023, Beijing blocked a joint India-US proposal to list Abdul Rauf Asghar and other anti-India terrorists.
Double Standards
This stands in contradiction to China’s own counterterrorism posture against separatist and Islamist groups that threaten Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, including in major cities like Karachi. In 2021, a suicide bomber affiliated with the Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) Majeed Brigade attacked a convoy carrying Chinese engineers and workers, killing three Chinese nationals near the Jinnah International Airport and the Chinese consulate area in Karachi. China has also raised similar concerns with the Taliban administration in Afghanistan regarding the alleged presence of Uyghur militant groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). This antithetical approach serves dual purposes – mitigating pressure on Pakistan’s influential military establishment while keeping India preoccupied with cross-border security challenges.
The SCO Factor
China’s selective counter-terror posture also plays out in other multilateral groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which remains a key arena for its regional influence. With India and Pakistan inducted as full members in 2017, China portrayed the bloc as a pan-Asia alternative to Western-led groupings. But India’s strong stance against cross-border terrorism and leanings towards the QUAD bloc have complicated that narrative.
India’s limited participation in the SCO, especially since 2019, is increasingly shaped by the grouping’s silence on cross-border terrorism allegations against Pakistan. India’s decision to downgrade its summit participation to a virtual format in 2023 further challenges China’s efforts to position the SCO as a counterweight to US influence in the region. For China, India’s continued engagement in the SCO remains crucial for maintaining the bloc’s diplomatic credibility. India could continue framing Chinese obstructionism as a significant concern for global counterterrorism efforts with the aim of raising the reputational and diplomatic costs of China’s inaction, without relying solely on the UNSC system.
India’s widening engagement with QUAD, involving Australia, Japan, India, and the US, through military exercises and joint dialogues, will also keep China on edge by signalling a strengthened Indo-Pacific alliance countering the Chinese regional influence.
(Aishwaria Sonavane is a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
